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TWOMBLYAND PARALLEL CONDUCT-HOW THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT GROUNDED IN RE TRAVEL AGENT
COMMISSION ANTITRUST LITIGATION
NATALIE N. DuBOSE*
N IN RE TRAVEL Agent Commission Antitrust Litigation, the
Sixth Circuit held that (1) United Airlines' decision to main-
tain its zero-percent-commission policy after emerging from
bankruptcy was not a continuing antitrust violation, and (2) alle-
gations against the remaining defendant airlines were insuffi-
cient to state a claim for antitrust conspiracy.1 In so doing, the
majority placed a difficult burden on the plaintiffs, ultimately
imposing a probability requirement that was inappropriate and
unrealistic for a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit
holding in this case misapplied the Twombly standard and set a
dangerous precedent that could "slowly eviscerat[e] antitrust en-
forcement under the Sherman Act."2 The appropriate action
would have been to grant a rehearing on the defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss, thereby preserving the distinctive burdens of
12 (b) (6) motions and summary judgment.
The plaintiffs, owners of forty-nine travel agencies, filed a
complaint against the defendant airlines for "illegally agreeing
to cap, cut, and eliminate base commissions in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act."' To establish a conspiracy in viola-
tion of Section 1, the plaintiffs needed to show a conspiracy be-
tween the defendants that imposed an unreasonable restraint of
trade.4 The plaintiffs contended that the conspiracy began in
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2012; B.B.A., Texas A & M
University, 2006. I would like to thank the SMU Law Review Association for their
assistance in publishing this case note.
Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust
Litig.), 583 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Jan. 10,
2011) (No. 09-1138).
2 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); In re Travel Agent,
583 F.3d at 914 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
3 In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 900 (majority opinion).
4 Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App'x 680, 682 (4th Cir. 2004).
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1995 when the airlines, playing follow-the-leader, cut commis-
sions .at the same time and same rate five straight times, until
they had reduced commissions to zero.5 The complaint alleged
that in 1981 and 1983, United and American attempted to lower
travel agent commission rates, but after other airlines failed to
follow, they resumed the industry-standard 10% commission
rate.6 But, in 1995, the airlines tried again and were ultimately
successful in eliminating travel agent commissions.' In 1995,
Delta, American, Northwest, United, and Continental each an-
nounced a $25 and a $50 cap on base commissions for one-way
domestic tickets and round-trip domestic tickets, respectively.'
In September 1997, November 1998, and October 1999, United
announced it would immediately reduce its commission rate or
commission caps, and within days each of the defendants fol-
lowed to match each of United's cuts exactly.9 In August 2001,
American announced new caps on commission rates, and again,
each of the defendants followed American within ten days.10 Fi-
nally, in March 2002, Delta announced it would eliminate air-
line commissions altogether, and within ten days, each of the
defendants followed."
In addition to this parallel conduct, the plaintiffs offered the
deposition of a former American executive who testified that
"'industry consensus' was necessary industry-wide for commis-
sion cuts to hold," and that American needed to "match com-
mission cuts exactly or [American] would undercut the
movement.' 1 2 The plaintiffs also pointed to several meetings be-
tween the defendants over the period in which the airlines were
acting in unison, providing both motive and opportunity to con-
spire: In mid-1999, a Northwest executive and an American ex-
ecutive "met for three hours in a Dallas hotel conference room,"
and in 2001, a Delta executive "met for a weekend of golf and
socializing at the home of an American executive responsible
for setting American's commission rates.'1 3 Additionally, during
the course of the alleged conspiracy, executives from American,
5 In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 899.
6 Id. at 900; Final Brief of Appellants at 8-9, In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d 896
(No. 07-4464).





12 Id. at 900.
13 Id.
TWOMBLY AND PARALLEL CONDUCT
United, Northwest, Continental, and Delta were all on the board
of directors for Orbitz, an online reservation company jointly
owned by the five largest competitors in the airline industry. 4
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that American CEO Robert Cran-
dall, who approved the commission cut from 8% to 5% in 1997,
had attempted this type of price-fixing scheme before and was
likely to do so again."
Plaintiff Tam Travel and forty-eight other travel agencies filed
a complaint against the defendant airlines alleging conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 16  The plaintiffs
amended their complaint after the Supreme Court decided
Twombly. 17 The district court granted the defendants' joint mo-
tion to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
and held that: (1) the plaintiffs failed to show sufficient parallel
conduct as to America West, Alaska, Frontier, Horizon, and
KLM; (2) "the emergence of Northwest, United, and Delta from
bankruptcy discharged the plaintiffs' claims" against those de-
fendants; (3) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Twombly
with regard to United and Continental; and (4) the plaintiffs
did not allege any facts against AAG, a holding company that
does not pay commissions. 8 The district court denied the plain-
tiffs' motion for reconsideration. 9 The Sixth Circuit, in a di-
vided decision, denied a rehearing en banc, and the plaintiffs
filed a petition for certiorari.20
The Sixth Circuit needed to determine: (1) what effect, if any,
bankruptcy had on the plaintiffs' claims when they alleged that
United rejoined the scheme after its reorganization; and (2)
whether the plaintiffs had met their burden of satisfying the
Twombly pleading standard required to survive a 12(b) (6) mo-
tion.21 Defendant Frontier filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy dur-
ing litigation, staying any judicial action; similarly, the parties
dismissed defendants Delta, Northwest, and KLM by stipulation
14 Final Brief of Appellants, supra note 6, at 15-16; AAI and 15 Consumer Organi-
zations Urge Rejection of Orbitz Airline Joint Venture, AM. ANTITRUST INST., http://
www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/ 10406 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
15 Final Brief of Appellants, supra note 6, at 13.
16 In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 900.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 900-01.
19 Id. at 901.
20 Id. at 896; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d 896
(No. 09-1138).
21 In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 901-02.
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during oral argument.2" Regarding United, the court con-
cluded that because the final act of the alleged conspiracy "oc-
curred in 2002, long before United emerged from bankruptcy,"
any later effects of United's acts were irrelevant in establishing
the plaintiffs' "continuing violation" theory.23 In determining
whether the plaintiffs' claims could withstand the defendants'
12(b) (6) motion, the court, citing Twombly, first concluded that
mere conscious parallel conduct was not sufficient to state a Sec-
tion 1 claim.24 Then, the court looked to the factual allegations
in the complaint and found that the plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint failed to "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
would reveal evidence of an illegal agreement. 25
The majority found that "because defendants' conduct was
not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained
by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior," the plain-
tiffs failed to allege sufficient facts beyond parallel conduct to
suggest a conspiracy. 26 The court looked to Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp. as the standard to evaluate parallel con-
duct.2 7 Under Monsanto, the Supreme Court concluded that to
prove a Section 1 conspiracy, "there must be evidence that tends
to exclude the possibility of independent action."28 The court re-
lied on American executive Michael Gunn's testimony that "an
independent reduction in commission rates would [have] ad-
vance[d] each defendant's economic self-interest" and con-
cluded that this was a reasonable alternative to support the
airlines' parallel-pricing behavior.29  The majority dismissed
Gunn's statement that American "had to match commission cuts
exactly or [it] would undercut the movement" by concluding
that it was 'ust as likely" that American was reducing its commis-
sion in the hopes that its competitors would follow, as it was that
American was involved in a conspiracy.30 Additionally, the court
was swayed by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hall v. United Air
Lines, Inc. (upholding a district court decision), in which a travel
agency class action alleged an identical Section 1 claim against
22 Id. at 901 n.5.
23 Id. at 902.
24 Id. at 904.
25 Id. at 909.
26 Id. at 908 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)).
27 Id. at 907 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752
(1984)).
28 Id. (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 752).
29 Id. at 908.
-o Id. at 909-10.
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the same defendants.3 1 The Hall court granted summary judg-
ment to the defendant airlines, finding that "commission cuts
and caps... were just as likely the result of competitive conduct
and natural changes in the market as of the illegal conspiracy
alleged by the plaintiffs. 3
2
Finally, the majority concluded that since Continental and
American were the only defendants left in the complaint, any
meetings between American, Delta, and Northwest were irrele-
vant to a Section 1 claim; similarly, the fact that American and
Continental executives both belonged to various trade associa-
tions provided a mere opportunity to conspire and did not sug-
gest an agreement between the two.3  Even Crandall's
statement ("I have a suggestion for you. Raise your goddamn
fares twenty percent. I'll raise mine the next morning.") would
not support the plaintiffs' claims because the statement, made
more than twenty-five years ago and to the president of a now-
defunct airline, was too remote to support an agreement about
commissions.34
The dissent took issue with the majority's application of
Twombly, forewarning that courts that continue to misinterpret
the Twombly and Iqbal standards will "slowly eviscerat [e] antitrust
enforcement under the Sherman Act."'35 The dissent pointed
out that the defendants' unilateral, follow-the-leader action
raised "a strong inference of agreement," and that by tying the
specific time and locations of numerous meetings with the in-
dustry-wide commission cuts that shortly followed, the com-
plaint clearly satisfied the Twombly standard. 6
The Sixth Circuit majority misinterprets the Twombly stan-
dard, inappropriately conflating the requirements to survive a
motion to dismiss with summary judgment requirements.
Under Twombly, the Supreme Court held that to survive a
12(b) (6) motion, the complaint must "identify[ ] facts that are
31 Id. at 909 n.8 (citing Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 652
(E.D.N.C. 2003), affd sub nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App'x 680 (4th
Cir. 2004)).
32 Id. (quoting Hall, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 671).
33 Id. at 910-11. The majority previously determined that the plaintiffs' com-
plaint included only bare assertions against Alaska, AAG, Horizon, and America
West, and therefore the plaintiffs failed to state a claim as to these defendants.
Id. at 905. Claims against defendants Delta, Northwest, KLM, and Frontier were
also dismissed. Id. at 901 n.5.
34 Id. at 911; Final Brief of Appellants, supra note 6, at 13 n.5.
35 Id. at 914 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 913.
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suggestive enough to render a § 1 conspiracy plausible."37 In
Iqbal, the Supreme Court addressed the plausibility standard,
stating that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable infer-
ence that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."3
The majority, while paying lip service to Twombly, actually
looked to two other cases for support, neither of which was de-
cided under Rule 12(b) (6). Although neither case addressed
the issue of what a plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim,
the court nevertheless looked to Monsanto and its application in
Re/Max International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc. for the majority's
proposition that to survive a 12(b) (6) motion, a plaintiff must
provide "sufficient circumstantial evidence tending to exclude
the possibility of independent conduct."4" This standard is inap-
propriate because both decisions were based on proof required
at a later stage in litigation-Re/Max was decided at the sum-
mary judgment stage, and Monsanto addressed the ultimate stan-
dard of proof required to prevail.4
The majority's evaluation of the claim based on standards
from a point later in the trial sequence is inappropriate, espe-
cially considering that, at this stage, discovery has barely begun.
The Supreme Court made this clear in Twombly, where the
Court actually used Monsanto to distinguish the escalating bur-
den requirements at different points during the trial se-
quence.4 2 The majority buttressed its decision with the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Hall (derived from a district court deci-
sion), where the court concluded that parallel conduct in reduc-
ing commission rates was 'just as likely the result of competitive
conduct and natural changes in the market as of the illegal con-
spiracy alleged by the plaintiffs."43 Again, the majority com-
pletely disregarded the fact that Hall was decided at the
summary judgment stage after the plaintiffs had an opportunity
37 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (emphasis added).
38 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
39 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Re/Max Int'l,
Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1999).
40 In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 907 (majority opinion) (citing Re/Max, 173
F.3d at 1025).
41 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768; Re/Max, 173 F.3d at 1025.
42 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554.
43 In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 909 n.8 (quoting Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
296 F. Supp. 2d 652, 671 (E.D.N.C. 2003), affd sub nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
118 F. App'x 680 (4th Cir. 2004)).
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to conduct discovery.44 By relying on these cases, the majority
inappropriately imposed a probability requirement, in essence
asking the plaintiffs to prove by their pleadings that parallel con-
duct was more likely the result of collusion than independent
action.
The majority summarily dismissed factual allegations in the
complaint, finding that they did not "raise a reasonable expecta-
tion that discovery [would] reveal an illegal agreement" between
the defendants.45 The majority also dismissed Crandall's sugges-
tion of price-fixing as too remote in time to support a plausible
inference of agreement between defendants, specifically be-
tween American and Continental.46 The majority's analysis of
the timeline is perplexing at best. It acknowledged that Cran-
dall was CEO until 1998, but nevertheless determined that his
departure was "at the very beginning of plaintiffs' conspiratorial
time line," although the plaintiffs alleged the conspiracy began
in 1995.47 Furthermore, Crandall's invitation to conspire with
one airline executive provided at least some support to the
plaintiffs' claim that he was conspiring with other airline execu-
tives, including Continental. To dismiss the claim because it is
unlikely that discovery will later reveal evidence of the conspir-
acy directly conflicts with the directive the Supreme Court gave
in Twombly: "[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it
may not be dismissed based on a district court's assessment that
the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allega-
tions or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder. ''4 It
was inappropriate for the majority to weigh whether the plain-
tiffs would ultimately prevail in deciding whether the plaintiffs
alleged enough factual matter to suggest that the defendants
had conspired.
The factual allegations provide more than enough support to
"nudge [the plaintiffs'] claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible."49 As shown by previous attempts, the scheme
would not work without unilateral, follow-the-leader action. As
the dissent pointed out, the complaint included specific time-
44 See Hall, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 660-61 (discussing the plaintiffs evidentiary bur-
den to survive summary judgment).
45 In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 911.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 899, 911.
48 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.8 (2007).
49 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (identifying the bar to survive a 12(b) (6)
motion).
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and-place factual allegations, in each case tying the meetings to
industry-wide commission reductions.5 ° Crandall's price-fixing
invitation is especially probative, considering he was the execu-
tive responsible for setting American's commissions."1 Moreo-
ver, the systematic reductions were a marked departure from
the industry's normal practice.52 Collectively, the factual allega-
tions clearly satisfy the Twombly standard.
This case illustrates the circuit split in applying Twombly. For
example, in Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, the Second
Circuit rejected the argument that a plaintiff must allege facts
tending to exclude self-interested conduct as a justification for
the parallel behavior and held that, under Twombly, a plaintiff
need only state "enough factual matter (taken as true) to sug-
gest that an agreement was made. '5 3 Similarly, other district
courts have also rejected the "dismemberment" approach taken
by the Sixth Circuit, including a district court in the Third Cir-
cuit, which recognized that "a district court must consider a
complaint in its entirety without isolating each allegation for in-
dividualized review. ' 54 The Supreme Court has denied certio-
rari in both Starr and In re Travel Agent, so the divergent
treatment of parallel conduct will continue until the Court
revisits the precedent-setting pleading standard set out in
Twombly and clarifies the factual support necessary to suggest an
agreement when parallel conduct is present.
By failing to acknowledge the different evidentiary require-
ments under a 12(b) (6) motion and summary judgment, the
Sixth Circuit creates an unreasonable burden for claimants
bringing antitrust suits. Rather than examine factual allegations
piecemeal against each defendant, the court should have looked
at the allegations as a whole to decide if enough factual matter
had been stated to suggest a conspiracy. Until the Supreme
Court clarifies the Twombly pleadings standard, it would be wise
for claimants bringing antitrust suits to avoid the Sixth Circuit.
50 In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 913 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
51 Id.
52 See id.
53 592 F.3d 314, 325 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3120 (U.S. Jan. 10,
2011) (No. 10-263).
54 In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 566 F. Supp. 2d 363, 373
(M.D. Pa. 2008).
